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ABSTRACT
The simple model of perfect competition in
spatial markets has been widely applied in ana-
lyzing international agricultural trade. Yet many
markets do not appear to be perfectly competitive.
In this paper we offer a new and efficient method
for computing spatial equilibrium in oligopolistic
or oligopsonistic markets. We apply the technique
to an analysis of several hypotheses of market
conduct in the international wheat market that have
been put forward by other authors. We conclude that
a duopsony model with Cournot-Nash behavior (styled
after Carter and Schmitz) does not perform well in
explaining trade.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The simple model of perfect competition in spatial markets has
been widely applied in analyzing international agricultural trade.
Following the developments of Samuelson and Takayama and Judge, it is
relatively easy to formulate and solve detailed and complex spatial
competitive equilibrium models. Yet as Thompson points out, analyses
based on the simple competitive model have yielded disappointing
results. Simple competitive theory seems unable to explain trade in
many agricultural markets.
It is often suggested that the poor performance of the simple com-
2
petitive model is due to the interference of governments in markets
or to manipulation by other market participants such as trading com-
panies (Webb, McCalla and Josling, and Morgan). Nearly 20 years ago
McCalla proposed that a US-Canada duopoly (with market power exercised
through government policy) was the more appropriate market conduct
assumption for the international wheat market. Later, Alaouze et al
and Carter and Schmitz suggested a triopoly and a duopsony, respectively,
as more appropriate market structure and conduct assumptions in this
market. Yet such imperfect competition hypotheses have made negligible
3
inroads into applied trade analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap between the
apparent structure and conduct of the international wheat market and
quantitative analyses of market performance. In doing so, we present
a new and efficient method for computing spatial equilbria in oligopo-
listic markets. The model and solution technique are based on non-
linear complementarity and represent a very promising way of formulating
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and solving both competitive and noncompetitive spatial equilibrium
problems. We then test various hypotheses of market conduct (mentioned
above) in the international wheat market using a simple imperfectly
competitive wheat trade model. Because of the methodological focus of
this paper, we have chosen to utilize costs and demands from Shei and
Thompson's previously published and relatively small model of the inter-
national wheat market. Thus, in essence we use their model, modifying
only their assumptions about market conduct and their computational
technique for finding market equilibria.
In the next section we review relevant developments in agri-
cultural trade analysis. In the third section of the paper we present
our model of reaction function equilibria and in the fourth section we
apply the model to the international wheat market as we attempt to
accept or reject several hypotheses about conduct in that market.
II. AGRICULTURAL TRADE MODELS
As in most economic analysis the paradigm of perfect competition
4
is widely used in evaluating agricultural trade and trade policies.
In his thorough review of US developments in agricultural trade
models, Thompson states that spatial price equilibrium models are
"the most common class of agricultural trade models, particularly for
comparative statics analysis of the effects of a change in policy."
Thompson supports this statement by citing nearly three dozen spatial
equilibrium models of international markets for wheat, rice, corn,
sugar, pork, beef, oranges, rapeseed, and peanuts.
Despite its popularity, it has been recognized for some time that
the paradigm of simple spatial competitive equilibrium suffers from
significant deficiencies, most notably poor performance in explaining
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trade patterns, particularly for wheat. Characteristically, such
models predict fewer bilateral trades than actually occur, although
many actual transactions are quite small. This class of models also
exhibits a high degree of sensitivity of equilibrium trade levels to
small parameter changes. In essense, the simple model of spatial per-
fect competition does not seem consistent with how international agri-
cultural markets operate.
There have been a number of different attempts to correct these
problems. One approach has been to hypothesize that commodities from
different suppliers are not perfect substitutes, despite their physi-
cal similarities. This differentiation may be due to institutional
factors, historic trade preferences or attitudes toward risk. The
result is that demand becomes more complex than in the simple com-
petitive model. This type of demand system is best exemplified by the
work of Armington.
A major thrust of the literature in correcting the predictive
deficiency of spatial equilibrium models is to examine more closely
the role of governments in markets. If one accepts that government
policy is predominantly responsible for differences between actual
trade patterns and those predicted by the simple competitive model,
then the focus of the analysis should be upon the determinants of
government policy.
"Endogenizing" government policy in trade analysis has taken two
directions. One direction has been to assume that government policy
is determined by domestic political factors and not by market power
considerations. The focus of such work is on governmental objectives
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in the policy-setting process (see Rausser et al). Sarris and
Freebairn examine the international wheat market and estimate the
relative weights governments place on domestic producer surplus, con-
sumer surplus, support program costs, and price stability. In an ana-
lysis of the soybean/rapeseed market, Meilke and Griffith estimate
government behavioral equations for the setting of tariffs and
domestic price supports for these commodities.
A second approach to analysis with endogenous government policy is
to assume that policies serve to coordinate consumers or producers so
that they may jointly exercise power in the international market.
Thus the international market would be expected to operate as any
oligopoly/oligopsony with countries as the participants. In 1966,
McCalla suggested that two producing countries dominate the world
wheat market and produce and price accordingly. Later Alaouze et al
proposed expanding the list of oligopolists to three by adding
Australia. Carter and Schmitz suggested that an EEC-Japan duopsony is
responsible for observed wheat trade and price patterns. On the
empirical side, Jeon has developed a non-spatial dynamic model of
duopoly in the world wheat market and Karp and McCalla have modeled
o
the world corn market as a difference game.
A simpler form of market manipulation is through the cartelization
of producers (or consumers). Schmitz et al have analyzed in depth the
possibility of a grain exporter's cartel. Pindyck has estimated the
potential gains from cartelization in the bauxite, copper and petroleum
markets while Pincus and Johnson have analyzed the potential cartel
profits for a number of agricultural commodities.
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III. SPATIAL EQUILIBRIA IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS
The purpose of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that the
international wheat market is imperfectly competitive. We propose to
test this hypothesis by introducing a spatial model of imperfect com-
petition in that market. However, one must be careful in defining a
model of imperfect competition. On the face of it, there are far too
many individual producers and consumers to apply any conventional model
of imperfect competition to the wheat market. However, if producers
(or consumers) are organized into a small number of groups and within
a group all producer (or consumer) actions are coordinated, then we
have an oligopoly (or oligopsony) among a few cartels of producers (or
consumers). In this paper the natural grouping is the nation (or, for
the EEC, several nations). Governments serve as coordinators of produ-
cers and consumers, looking after their interests as groups. The model
then is of imperfect competition among nations. A few nations dominate
the market from either the producing or consuming side and set tariffs,
price supports, quotas or other instruments to maximize the economic
welfare of the producers of consumers they represent.
With that introduction we will move to describe our model of
imperfect competition. Although the actors in the model are pro-
ducing and consuming nations
,
without loss of generality the model is
described mathematically in terras of a few producers and consumers
interacting in an imperfectly competitive market. To enhance the
model description, we will present it in two steps. We first discuss
reaction function models and present a simple model of spaceless
-7-
reaction function equilibria. We then present a model of spatial oli-
gopoly and oligopsony.
To understand why the model is presented in the particular form it
is, the reader should be aware that the model is formulated and solved
9
as a nonlinear complementarity problem. Let there be some n x 1 vector
of variables, _x_, and an n x 1 vector valued function, f(x) . The nonli-
near complementarity problem is to find an _x__>__0_ so that f(x)
_>_ 0_ and
x.f.(x) = for all i. In other words we seek a vector x with non-
i l — —
negative components so that £XjO is also nonnegative. Further,
matching _x with _f_(_x) , component by component, at least one member of
each pair of x. and f.(x) must be zero. As will become evident
l l —
throughout the remainder of this section, the models of imperfect com-
petition presented here are precisely of this form. Efficient computer
algorithms are available for solving the linear and nonlinear compli-
10
mentarity problem.
A. A Spaceless Reaction Function Oligopoly Model
Consider the case of I producers of a single commodity. Denote by
q. the output of the ith producer and denote by tt . (_q_) the profit of
the ith producer. (Tt is not necessary to explicitly consider demand
since each producer's profit function involves the output of all
producers). Each producer (i) has the simple problem of choosing q.
to maximize tt
.
:
l
max tt
. (_q_) (la)
q,-
q. > (lb)
1
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If ii is pseudoconvex then necessary and sufficient conditions for
profit maximization are:
dir.
+ X* =
dq,
(2a)
X*q. =
A*,q. >
(2b)
(2c)
or equivalently,
dir.
<dq." (3a)
dir,
dq.
*
q. >
= 0. (3b)
(3c)
Note two things about equation (3). First, it is in the form of a
nonlinear complementarity problem, and secondly, the two equations im-
plicitly define the optimal output for producer i as a function of the
output of all other producers: q.(q.., ..., q._-,> q- + i» •••> q )•
This of course is producer i's reaction function or best reply func-
tion (see Friedman). The reaction function model can take on many
forms depending on how the producer thinks his profits will change as
he changes output (dfr./dq.). It is in computing the derivative of
profit with respect to output that conjectures about behavior of com-
petitors enter. It is conventional to express such conjectures
through a "conjectural variation." Let r. . be the conjectural
-9-
variation of producer i with respect to producer j; i.e., r. . is pro-
ducer i's conjecture of how q. will change when q. is changed
3q
i
'
(r.
.
=
,
J
,
conjectured). Thus Eqn. (3) can be rewritten as
3tt.
I -r-i- r. . : (4a)
tfq
.
ii —
J 3
q i
3tt.
£ -5— r.
.
= (4b)
q. > (4c)
where of course r. . = 1. A Nash equilibrium in this market can be
ii
determined by finding a vector
_q_* which satisfies a pair of Eqn. 4 for
each producer (I inequalities, I equalities).
The various models of reaction function equilibrium differ in the
assumed conjectural variation. A Cournot-Nash equilibrium corresponds
to r. . = 0, i * j and can be thought of as a maximum market power non-
cooperative equilibrium in that each producer behaves as if he were
a single monopolist facing a residual demand curve. He takes no
account of the response of competitors to his actions. On the other
hand, a Bertrand equilibrium corresponding to 2 r., = -1, is a mini-
k*i
mum market power situation. In this case, each producer assumes that
any reduction in his own output will be exactly matched by competitors.
In the case when outputs from different producers are perfect substi-
tutes, the Bertrand model results in marginal cost pricing.
B. Spatial Oligopoly/Oligopsony With A Competitive Fringe
We now extend our model to a spatial market. The model presented
here is of a spatial market for a single good at a point in time. The
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essence of the spatial aspects of the market is that transportation of
goods from producers to consumers is a costly process. While the model
is presented in terms of producers and consumers, it is producer and
consumer nations (or groups of nations) that will be assumed to exer-
cise market power when the model is applied to the international wheat
market. We present two different but similar spatial models, one of
oligopoly and one of oligopsony.
Let 1=1, ..., 1 index producers and j = 1, ..., J index con-
sumers, and further, let
q.. denote quantity shipped from producer i to consumer j
T.
.
denote the unit transport cost from producer i to con-
sumer j
P.(Zq..) denote the inverse demand function for consumer i
J . lj
c
.
( Eq . . ) denote the marginal cost function for producer i.
l .11 r
J
The first of these variables is endogeneous, to be computed. The
transport cost and the marginal cost and inverse demand functions are
exogenous. Note that by indexing the shipments by origin and destina-
tion, we are allowing producers or consumers to price discriminate.
Producers and consumers that are price takers will price at marginal
cost or along their demand curve, in equilibrium. Producers exer-
cising market power will price at or above marginal cost. Consumers
exercising market power will offer prices at or below their demand
curve. Although market-manipulating producers and consumers can both
be included in a single model, for clarity of exposition we will treat
these two situations separately.
-Il-
ia A Model of Spatial Oligopoly
We first consider a model of oligopoly, with some nation-producers
exercising market power and all others in a competitive fringe. All
consumers can be totally represented by their inverse demand curves.
Thus there are two types of producers in the market: oligopolists and
the competitive fringe. Denote the set of oligopolists by M = {i|i is
an oligopolist}. Each producer has the same objective, to maximize
profits over q.. > 0:
ij —
£q. .
J
1J
it. = E (P.(Z q.,.) - T..) q.. - / c.(x)dx . (5)
The price the producer faces is the consumer price (P.) less the
transport cost (x..). Thus the first term in Eqn. 5 represents reve-
ij
nues. The second term, the integral under the marginal cost curve,
represents total variable costs. Producers maximize profits by
choosing quantity sold to each consumer, q... As in equation (3), the
12
first order conditions for a maximum of (5) are
(6)
dP.
w.. = [P,(Z q.,.) - T.. + q.. - 2-- c.(Z q. .,)} < 0, q. . > 0, w. .q. . = 0,Vj
ij J if i J iJ ij dq t i jt ij — iJ — ij ij
In the expression above, the dummy variable w. . is used to facili-
tate indicating that the term in braces must be nonpositive and that
its product with q.., must be zero. The complementarity condition is
necessary because we would expect some flows (q..) to be zero and thus
the corresponding w. . to be perhaps negative. The first three terras
of the expression in braces of course represent marginal revenue. A
fundamental distinguishing characteristic of a spatial model of trade
is that one cannot determine a priori which producer-consumer pairs
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will have no trade (q.. = 0). Thus the necessity for this condition
which is more complex than just marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
For a price taker (the competitive fringe), dP./dq.. is considered
to be zero since the price taker assumes the market price is insen-
sitive to changes in his output. Thus for the competitive fringe,
first order conditions (6) are quite simple:
w.. = (P.(Z q.,.) - T.. - c.(Z q..,)} < 0, q > 0, w..q.. = 0, Vj , i*M (7)
This expression merely states that the price net of transport cost is
equal to marginal cost unless no transactions take place (q.. - 0) in
which case price can be less than marginal cost.
We turn now to the case of the oligopolist whose perception that
he faces downward sloping demand curves is what causes him to try to
extract monopoly rent. Oligopolist i's perception of dP./dq.. depends
on (a) the actual slope of the demand curve for consumer j; and (b) his
perception of the extent to which competitors will change their sales
to consumer j in response to a change in his sales to consumer j, q. .
:
dP.CJ.q., .)
—
^—i-L-= p'(Z qJfJ )[l + r,J VieM (8)dq
± j 3 ± ,
i j ij
In Eqn. (8), r.. is oligopolist i's perception of how sales of all com-
petitors combined, to consumer j, change with q..:r. . = A( E q.t.)/Aq..,ij ij vt± 1 J iJ
conjectured. Note that for simplicity this is an aggregate conjectural
variation—individual reactions of competitors are aggregated into r...
Thus, combining Eqn. (6) and (8), first order conditions for profit
maximization for each oligopolist are given by
-13-
w.. = (P. (2 q ) - t + q p|(Z q..,)[l + r..] - c .
(
I q..,)J < 0,ij J ,. ij ij i j* J
~~
(9)
J
q . . > 0, w. .q. . = Yj.ieMij — ij ij
This is a standard condition, that for any sales to take place from
producer i to consumer j, perceived marginal revenue must be equal to
marginal cost. If no sales occur, marginal revenue may be less than
marginal cost. Obviously, with r.. = -1 (a Bertrand equilibrium),
Eqn. (8) reduces to price equals marginal cost (if sales occur).
The entire spatial oligopoly model consists of I x J variables
(the q. .) and a vector valued function w of dimension I x J defined by
ij
equations (7) and (9). The form of these equations corresponds pre-
cisely to the nonlinear complementarity problem: find
_q__>_ _0_ such that
w(q) < and w. .q. . = 0.
—
* ij ij
2 . A Model of Spatial Oligopsony
We turn now to the situation where some consumers exercise market
power. Other consumers and all producers are price takers. Define
the set of oligopsonists as N = {j | j is an oligopsonist} . Prices
offered by producers are assumed equal to their marginal production
costs. Consumers will be assumed to maximize consumer surplus,
choosing purchases from each producers, q..:
2q..
i 1J
S. = / P.(x)dx - S(c.(S q..,) + T..)q.. (10)
J
J
J
±
l y U U ij
The above expression consists of two parts. The first is the area
under the consumer's demand curve. The second is total outlays for
goods, which are given by the product of price paid and quantity
purchased. Price is, of course, marginal production cost plus
-14-
transport cost. First order conditions for surplus maximization are
• u c j 13straightforward:
dc
u.. = {P. (2 q.,.) - [c.(S q.. f ) + T ] - q —— } <ij J
± ,
i j i j* J J J q ii
~~
(11)
q.. > 0, u..q.. = 0, Vi,i
Once again, it is in how the consumer perceives dc./dq.. that dis-
i ij
tinguishes oligopsonists from price-taking consumers. A price-taking
consumer assumes he cannot affect the price he pays by cutting back on
purchases. Thus for the price-taking consumer, the first order con-
dition (11) becomes
u.. = {P. (I q .•;.) - [c.(Z q..,) + T..]} < 0, q.. > 0, u..q.. = 0, j*N. (12)ij J v i j i i' J 1J — ij ~ ij ij
This is the same condition as for competitive producers (equation 7):
that for trade to occur, marginal costs including transport costs equal
the demand price.
Oligopsonists perceive that marginal costs are upward sloping:
surplus can be extracted from producers by reducing purchases and thus
driving down price. As in the case of oligopoly, an oligopsonist '
s
perception of dc./dq.. depends on the slope of producer i's marginal
cost curve as well as the oligopsonist 's perception of how his fellow
consumers will respond to an effort to drive down the price of producer
i's product:
^'"Ij^
= c,(S q, .,)(! + s, ,) (13)dq
.
. i
.
, ij ij
ij j
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where s.. is oligopsonist j's perception of how purchases from i of
all other consumers combined change with q..: s.. = A( E q..,)/Aq..,
ij iJ j'*j J J
conjectured. Thus first order conditions (11) for consumer surplus
maximization for the oligopsonists are
u.. = {P. (E q,,.) - [c.(Z q.. t ) + T..] - q..c!(S q..,)(l + S,.)} <iJ 3
±
,
i J i y ij ij ij i y ij' ij —
(1A)
q
±J
2. °> uij^ij
=
°» *» J eN
Thus for any sales to occur, the perceived marginal gain in surplus
from a reduced price for the good must be equal to the marginal loss
in surplus due to reduced consumption.
The spatial oligopsony model consists of I x J variables (the q. .)
and a vector valued function _u of dimension I x J defined by equations
(12) and (14). The model in full form is to find a vector
_£__>_ _0_ such
that _u_(q_)
_< 0_ and u. .q. . = 0. This is precisely the nonlinear corapli-
mentarity problem.
IV. COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT MARKET
In this section we apply our spatial model to the international
wheat market and examine the ability of four market conduct hypotheses
to explain 1972-73 trade. Costs and demand relations are taken
14directly from Shei and Thompson. The Shei and Thompson model is a
classic spatial equilibrium model with five producing countries or
regions and nine consuming countries or regions. They estimate a set
of five linear export supply functions and nine linear demand equa-
tions. With a per-unit transportation cost associated with every
producer-consumer pair, the model is completely specified and they find
an equilibrium by the conventional method of maximizing consumer plus
-16-
producer surplus. Although more current models of wheat trade may be
available, the Shei and Thompson model was chosen for its relative
simplicity and well-documented performance.
The hypotheses of market conduct we examine are a) a Canada-US
duopoly; b) a Canada-US-Australia triopoly; c) a Japan-EEC duopsony;
and d) perfect competition or free trade. As we indicated earlier,
the first three of these conduct models have been suggested in the
literature as plausible for the international wheat market. All
agents other than the oligopolists/oligopsonists are assumed to behave
competitively. A fundamental assumption for all of these cases is that
of Cournot-Nash behavior— the conjectural variations discussed in the
16
previous section are all assumed to be zero. In other words, when
importers or exporters determine trade levels, shipment patterns among
all other participants are taken as given and fixed. The analysis
involves finding equilibrium trade levels for each of these conduct
assumptions and comparing the results to actual trade.
For comparison, Table I shows actual trade shares and prices for
1972-73 and Table II shows trade shares and prices under the perfectly
competitive (free trade) market conduct assumption. Table II exhibits
the classic characteristics of a competitive spatial equilibrium
model. Net trade levels for particular countries are in fair agreement
with the actual levels; but the trade flows between specific countries
are generally inconsistent with the actual flows. The competitive
equilibrium model shows far fewer non-zero trades than in actuality.
In that model Australia, Argentina, and the EEC each serve only one
-17-
consuraer as opposed to many in actuality. The predicted export prices
are in fair agreement, however.
For comparison, the trade share matrix associated with the duopoly
18
market conduct assumption is presented in Table III. Note that
there are many more non-zero trades in this case than in the free
trade case (Table II). Also, the trade shares from each of the duo-
polists are in "reasonable" agreement with actual trade (Table I).
However, trade from Australia, Argentina and the EEC are quite dif-
ferent than in actuality (compare Table III and Table I). Export
prices presented in Table III are also in "reasonable" agreement with
Table I.
We now move to the question of quantifying model performance in ex-
plaining trade. Our fundamental goal is to determine which model, if
any, can be judged statistically acceptable in explaining trade. To do
this we will present several statistics representing the degree to which
model-predicted trade corresponds to actual trade. Ideally, we would
like a distribution on the forecast trade share matrix so that we could
determine if the mean forecast trade matrix differs in a statistical
sense from actual trade. Unfortunately, we do not have a distribution
on forecast trade shares. For each conduct assumption we have a single
deterministic forecast trade matrix to compare to a single actual trade
matrix. We do not consider multiple time periods, which might be use-
ful for imputing a distribution for the trade matrices. Nevertheless,
it is still possible to qualitatively compare the matrices and, using
some moderate assumptions, statistically compare the matrices and test
our hypotheses of market conduct. We use two measures to compare fore-
casted trade shares with the base level of trade: the Theil inequality
-18-
coefficient and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. The Theil
coefficient is not a statistic in the sense of hypothesis testing but
can be used to obtain a qualitative estimate of goodness-of-f it . The
Spearman coefficient can be used for hypothesis testing if (after
Teigen) we pair corresponding elements of the actual and predicted
trade matrices and then treat the resulting set of pairs as a sample
u- . . 19from a bivariate population.
The Theil inequality coefficient (as defined in Theil) has been
widely used to compare forecasts with actual values. Much insight can
be gained using the inequality coefficient but it cannot be used for
hypothesis testing in our case because it is not distribution free.
The inequality coefficient (U) is in essence the root-mean-squared
error between elements of the predicted and actual trade matrices, nor-
malized so that the coefficient lies between zero and one. Perfect
prediction is associated with a zero inequality coefficient. Further
s cinsight is gained by calculating the variance (U ) and covariance (U )
proportions of the inequality coefficient. These two proportions sum
20
to unity. Suppose predicted values are plotted against actual
values. For perfect forecasting, all points would lie along a 45°
line. The variance proportion indicates the extent to which the slope
of a regression line through the points deviates from one. The co-
variance proportion indicates the spread of points about this regres-
sion line. Thus, the closer the covariance proportion is to a maximum
of one, the better the forecast since the variance proportion would
then be small, and one would expect some random component in forecasts.
-19-
A second statistic we use is the Spearman rank correlation coeffi-
cient (see Conover), which is a nonparametric statistic. Pairing each
element of the actual (A) and predicted (P) trade matrices, we can view
21
these pairs (a.., p..) as samples from a bivariate distribution.
ij ij
Regressing p. . against a. . we obtain a. . = a + p. . + e . . . We can
ij ij iJ ij ij
test the null hypothesis that a = and 3=1 (i.e., that the model is
a perfect predictor). However, the elements of the predicted trade
matrix are not independent nor is there a conventional population from
which the (a.., p..) pairs are drawn. Nevertheless, this statistic andij ij
the Theil inequality coefficient should give us a strong foundation on
which to test our hypothesis of the performance of the four models of
market conduct.
With regard to the hypotheses of market conduct, Table IV shows the
two measures of consistency between actual trade shares and simulated
trade shares under the four market conduct assumptions. Note that for
both the Theil and Spearman statistics, the duopoly and triopoly market
conduct assumptions perform considerably better than either the free
trade or EEC-Japan duopsony conduct assumptions. The Theil inequality
coefficient and the variance proportion are considerably lower in the
two oligopoly cases. However, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
paints a slightly different picture, suggesting that the free trade
conduct assumption behaves fairly well. However, one must interpret
the Theil and Spearman statistics in conjunction with one another. The
Spearman coefficient suggests that the pairs of actual and predicted
shares for free trade lie nicely along the 45° line. In fact, the
three models (all except duopsony) perform similarily on this count.
-20-
However the Theil inequality coefficient suggests that free trade gives
much greater dispersion about this 45° line than do the oligopoly models
,
Thus taking the two statistics together points to the superiority of
the two oligopoly models with the duopoly model performing best.
We turn now to testing hypotheses of market conduct. Our null
hypothesis is that a model predicts trade. More specifically, if one
regresses actual trade against predicted trade (a.. = a+ 3p. . + £..),
ij ij ij
the hypothesis is that (ot,0) = (0,1): that actual and predicted trade
are the same, except for a zero-mean error. Our goal then is to
reject the hypothesis for some of the conduct assumptions. At the 90
percent level we can reject the null hypothesis for all except the
duopoly model. At the 95 percent and 99 percent level, we can only
reject the hypothesis for the duopsony model. Thus on all counts, the
duopsony model performs very poorly.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Probably the most significant contribution of this paper is our
development of a model of spatial imperfectly competitive equilibrium.
The approach increases the applicability of spatial equilibrium models
to markets that can be characterized as reaction-function oligopolies/
oligopsonies, and even offers promise for formulating conventional
competitive spatial equilibrium models. The methodology is relatively
easy to implement and, in terms of computer time, quite efficient.
Another contribution of the paper lies in testing three imper-
fect competition models of the international wheat market, models that
have received considerable attention in the literature. While the
-21-
three models (duopoly, triopoly and duopsony) were suggested by
McCalla (1966), Alaouze et al (1978) and Carter and Schmltz (1979),
respectively, these authors do not necessarily assume Cournot-Nash
price discriminating behavior. Nevertheless, we were able to demon-
strate that the duopsony conduct assumption is a very poor explainer of
trade. The duopoly and triopoly models performed considerably better,
with the duopoly model forecasts being slightly closer to the actual
values than the triopoly model.
-22-
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2
In fact, by imposing exogeneously specified government policies
on competitive equilibrium models, equilibria can be brought into
better agreement with actual trade patterns.
3
There are several possible reasons for this, including the
variety of behavioral models of imperfect competition, each resulting
in a different equilibrium level of trade (see Sarris and Schmitz).
Further, there have been no generally available computational methods
for computing spatial equilibrium in imperfect markets.
4
There are two classes of models commonly referred to as spatial
equilibrium models. True spatial equilibrium models assume that the
price difference for a commodity at two different locations only need
be exactly equal to transport cost if trade occurs between the two
locations. Equilibrium prices and quantities in such models can be
determined by a variety of methods although mathematical programming
is most frequently used (following methods suggested by Samuelson and
developed by Takayama and Judge). In the second class of spatial
models, the assumption is made that prices at various locations are
related in some fixed manner to a numeraire price. Such models have
the advantage that they are more easily estimated by simultaneous
equation methods but the fixed structure of prices is usually only an
approximation to a true competitive price equilibrium.
One might think there is an inconsistency between perfect com-
petition and trade policies or barriers. However, as long as there
are many price taking producers and consumers, free entry and exit and
trade barriers are considered totally exogenous
,
then the model of
perfect competition is still appropriate.
Brock and Magee actually outline the process in the United States
whereby an industrial group can induce the government to impose trade
policies that are in the group's interest.
It should be noted that the duopoly and triopoly models of the
wheat market suggested by McCalla and Alaouze et al. are really co-
operative oligopolies and thus basically cartels. In their models
they assume an agreement exists among the oligopolists regarding
pricing and sharing of demand. Carter and Schmitz are not very spe-
cific about the operation of a wheat duopsony although they too
suggest some sort of cooperative arrangement.
-23-
8
It is generally difficult to compute market equilibria in non-
competitive situations. Recently, Spence has shown how the com-
putation of equilibrium in some monopolisitically competitive markets
can be reduced to the maximization of a single function. Murphy et
al. have proposed an iterative method for computing a Nash equilibrium
for an oligopoly by way of a sequence of mathematical programs. It
has been known for some time that equilibrium in the case of a pure
monopoly (or monopsony) can be determined by maximizing producer (or
consumer) surplus (Takayama and Judge).
9
The idea of using a nonlinear complementarity algorithm to find
an equilibrium in an imperfectly competitive market originated in
discussions between Lars Mathiesen and the first author. Mathiesen
was actually involved in the early stages of formulating the structure
of the model presented here and subsequently went on to develop his
own model of international steel trade (Mathiesen, 1983). His contri-
butions are appreciated.
The principal algorithm for solving the linear complementarity
problem is due to Lerake and has been implemented by many including
Tomlin. A number of algorithms have been proposed for solving the
nonlinear complementarity problem (e.g., Mathiesen 1982). It should
be noted that in general one is not assured of a unique solution to the
complementarity problem.
Bresnahan's consistent conjectures equilibrium and limit pricing
equilibria involve conjectural variations that are themselves
variables and thus endogenous to the problem.
12
Note that we have assumed SPkV^ii = f°r J * k, which means
that by changing shipments to one consumer a producer cannot affect
another consumer's price.
13
As in equation (6), here we assume that dc'K /dq-H = for i * k.
The interpretation is that cutbacks in purchaser from one producer
cannot affect the price of any other producer.
14
The transport costs which were used by Shei and Thompson were
not readily available. However, the model resulting from the use of
the transport costs from Sharpies closely approximated the results
reported by Shei and Thompson.
Thus the resulting imperfectly competitive model is actually a
linear complementarity problem, easier to solve than the general
nonlinear complementarity problem.
-i (.
The duopoly, triopoly and duopsony cases are examined because
they have been suggested by the other authors mentioned earlier in the
paper. However, these authors do not necessarily assume Cournot-Nash
behavior. Thus our models may not correspond exactly to theirs.
The resulting models are quite small, with solution time of up
to 20 CPU seconds on a DEC VAX-11/780 computer (for the triopoly
case)
.
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Teigen assumes that, for a producer-consumer pair, the actual
trade (a) and predicted (p) are sample pairs from a bivariate distri-
bution and then calculates the Pearson correlation between a., and p...
However, the Pearson correlation coefficient is not a distribution- J
free statistic and thus is not applicable for testing the relationship
between a., and p... The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is
distribution free and thus corrects this problem.
19
Trade share matrices for the duopsony and triopoly cases are
available upon request from the authors.
20
The bias proportion will be close to zero due to the fact that
elements of the share matrices sum to one.
21
Let A and P be the actual and predicted trace matrices, respec-
tively, with elements a-jj and Pi j • Assume each (a-H, Pij) pair is
independent (a strong assumption in our case). Let a and p be the
mean values of a-^-j and Pij computed from the sample. Given the rela-
tionship a-M - a = a + 3 (Pij ~ p) + e ij > we can estimate a and 3.
Since a = and a = p, we wish to test the null hypothesis that 3=1.
To do this, we let u-jj = a^i - p-ji and test the extent of correlation
between u^ i and p£ -j using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
(p). For our case of a sample of size 45, the null hypothesis can be
rejected if |p| > .248 (at the 90% level) or |p | > .295 (at the 95%
level)
.
-25-
REFERENCES
1. Alaouze, C. M. , Watson, A. S., and Sturgess, N. H. , "Oligopoly
Pricing in the World Wheat Market," Araer. J. Agric. Econ., 60 pp.
173-185 (May 1978).
2. Armington, P. S., "A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished
by Place of Production," International Monetary Fund Staff
Papers,
_16_(1) pp. 159-176 (March 1969).
3. Breshahan, T. F., "Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures,"
Amer. Econ. Rev., 71(5) PP» 934-935 (December 1981).
4. Brock, W. A. and Magee, S. P., "The Economics of Special Interest
Politics: The Case of a Tariff," Amer. Econ. Rev., 68 (2 ) pp.
246-250 (1978).
5. Carter, C. and Schmitz, A., "Import Tariffs and Price Formation
in the World Wheat Market," Amer. J. Agric. Econ., 61 pp. 517-22
(August 1979).
6. Conover, W. J., Practical Nonparametric Statistics 2nd Edition
(John Wiley, New York, 1980).
7. Friedman, J., "Oligopoly Theory," in Handbook of Mathematical
Economics , Kenneth J. Arrow and Michael D. Intriligator, Eds.
(North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982), Chap. II, Vol. II, pp. 491-534.
8. Jeon, D., "A Study of Stability Conditions for the Imperfect
World Wheat Market: A Duopoly Simulation Model," J. Rural Dev.
,
4_, 37-53 (1981).
9. Johnson, H. G. , "The Gain from Exploiting Monopoly or Monopsony
Power in International Trade," Economica, 3 5 pp. 151-156 (May
1968),
10. Karp, L. S. and McCalla, A. F., "Dynamic Games and International
Trade: An Application to the World Corn Market," Amer. J. Agric.
Econ.,
_65_(4) pp. 641-656 (1983).
11. Lemke, C. E. , "Biamatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical
Programming," Mgmt. Sci.
_11_, 681-689 (1965).
12. Mathiesen, L., "Complementarity and Economic Equilibrium: A
Modelling Format and an Algorithm (Preliminary Draft)," Dept. of
Operations Research, Stanford University, Stanford, California
(January 1982).
-26-
13. Mathiesen, L. , "Modeling Market Equilibria: An Application to
the World Steel Market," unpublished working paper, Center for
Applied Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, Norway (1983).
14. McCalla, A. F. and Josling, T. E. (eds.), Imperfect Markets in
Agricultural Trade (Allanhed, Osmun & Co., Montclair, NJ , 1981).
15. McCalla, A. F. , "A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing," J. Farm
Economics,
_48_ pp. 711-27 (1966).
16. Meilke, K. D. and Griffith, G. R. , "Incorporating Policy Variables
in a Model of the World Soybean/Rapeseed Market," Amer. J. Ag.
Econ., j>5_ pp. 65-73 (Feb. 1983).
17. Morgan, Daniel, Merchants of Grain (Viking, New York, 1979).
18. Murphy, F. H. , Sherali, H. D., and Soyster, A. L. , "A Mathematical
Programming Approach for Determining Oligopolistic Market
Equilibrium," Math. Pgming, 2A_y pp. 92-106 (1982).
19. Pincus, J. A., Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing
,
(John
Hopkins, Baltimore, 1965).
20. Pindyck, R. , "Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of
Exhaustible Resources," Rev. Econ. and Stat., 60 pp. 238-251
(1978).
21. Rausser, G. C, Litchtenberg, E., and Lattimore, R. , "Develop-
ments in Theory and Empirical Application of Endogenous Govern-
ment Behavior," Chap. 18 in G. C. Rausser (ed.), New Directions
in Econometric Modelling and Forecasting in US Agriculture
(North-Holland, 1982).
22. Salant, S. W. , Imperfect Competition in the World Oil Market
(Lexington Books. Lexington, MA, 1982).
23. Sarris, A. H. and Freebairm, J., "Endogenous Price Policies and
International Wheat Prices," Amer. J. Ag. Econ., 65 pp. 214-224
(May 1983).
24. Sarris, A. H. and Schmitz, A., "Price Formation in International
Agricultural Trade," in McCalla and Josling (eds.), op. cit.,
Chapter 3.
25. Schmitz, A., McCalla, A. F., Mitchell, D. 0., and Carter, C,
Grain Export Cartels (Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1981).
26. Sharpies, J. A., "The Short-Run Elasticity of Demand for US Wheat
Exports," US Dept. of Agriculture, IED Staff Report, Washington,
DC (April 1982).
-27-
27. Shei, S-Y. and Thompson, R. L. , "The Impact of Trade Restrictions
on Price Stability in the World Wheat Market," Am. J. Ag. Econ.
59
,
pp. 628-638 (1977).
28. Spence, M. , "The Implicit Maximization of a Function in
Monopolistically Competitive Markets," Harvard Institute of
Economic Research Discussion Paper 461, Cambridge, MA (March
1976).
29. Takayama, T. and Judge, G. G. , Spatial and Temporal Price and
Allocation Models
,
(North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971).
30. Teigen, L. , "Testing a Theoretical Model for World Trade Shares,"
Agricultural Economics Research, 29
,
(2) 56-59 (1977).
31. Theil, H. , Economic Forecasts and Policy
,
2nd Edition (North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1961).
32. Thompson, R. L., "A Survey of Recent US Developments in Inter-
national Agricultural Trade Models," US Department of Agriculture
Economic Research Service, Biblio. and Lit. of Ag. Rpt. #21,
Washington, DC (September 1981).
33. Tomlin, J. A., "Robust Implementation of Lemke's Method for the
Linear Complementarity Problem," Systems Optimization Laboratory
Report SOL 76-24, Department of Operations Research, Stanford
University, Stanford, California (September 1976).
34. Webb, A.J. , "World Trade in Major US Crops, A Market Share
Analysis," US Department of Agriculture, Economics and Statistics
Service, International Economics Division (April 1981).
D/225
a>
t/i c
10 s- o
u o *->O Q.
— £CO
-. O
in in cm in >— lo i— co co
CM
en
in
LU
C_)
os:
o <r>
o ^
CO I
CM
>• r*»
CO CD
CO
LU •>
< o
3: •—
i
co I—
«t
LU ZQ .—
< h-
C£ CO
I— UJQ
I—
< >-
LU CC
x <:
< o.
=3
I— Q
C_> Z
< <
OJ
(-)
i-
C
co
UJ
_1
CO
C_3
ro cm i— in
—
i i c\j i— o i O lo i
i l o O O I O O lII • . . I . • I
o o o o o in
CO
in
o
c
cu
CD
<
rt3
to
c
to
<_>
r— r-» co >— *rO • i
—
I • O I O coO I O I l O I o o
• I • I I . I . •
o o o o o
in
CO
CO
Cn
in
00
cm in «3- in cm co >— «3-o
i
— O CM >— O O O '—
—
ooooooooo
OOOOOOOOO
oo^j-^rocMCOCMena^
ooooooooo
ooooooooo
in
in
CTi
o
en
o
en
«3"
en
o
en
c
^ O c s «a- r-~ in cr> C\J oin r— <^J r_ *d- — CM in in t/>
co o o r— !— o c en CO a.3 • Eo c O o c o c o c CT> CM o
CM CTi sz.
t-
(T3 c
cu u (O
<=. a. •^*
O o i~ 00 ^
•^ s-
£
4-> *—
-
CU CU
-u 3 i_ V) CJ -—*. JZ
«o to LU <c O CU •r— CU CO
c r* a) Q. c S_ c
*r— 00 Q. • 1 X c Q_ c
4-> cC o 3 CO UJ o o • •
i/l i_ re M 4-> 4-> CU
CJ c S_ Z3 i_ (J s_ r— i_ ^^ <_>a <o cu cx UJ CU •^ cu <C<0 o W4- u
O.CJ -C LO C-J .C S_ JZ +-> o a. co 3
(O a: -M CO • UJ -*-> u- u o r— X o o
-D Cu O O LU UJ O < o f— —
-
UJ —
'
CO
-28-
O)
c
i~ O o
D. S- "^
e a. v*
I—
i
OO
cr>Lr>co>— >— i>ocoLnco
CO
<u
i— ••-> c
(O i- o
^_> o -»->O Q.
I— SO
—• o
Qi I—
< UJ
^: •m
i—
i
cc
en <
a. 2.
- UJ
z >
< 1—
1
1—
UJ 1—
H
<_) 1—
c: UJ
ZD Q.
CZ s:
t/J c
C_"
>-
cc >-
_l
00 1—
UJ o
OS UJ
< Li-X es:
>y. UJ
Q.
ID Oi— CO CD 00 CO CD CO 00
LT> LD CM "3" O LT) r— IT) V£> f-
— f— in
Q ...
<c m
i— i
cm
I— r-
< a
c
UJ h-
0)
u
o
oo
UJ
(TJ
c
CJ
CD
3
o
i r-«. i
l O l
en
CM
i co I
I O i CO
00
CM
1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1
• •— 1 | 1 | 1
1 • t 1 1 1 1
CM
CC CO
CD
<T3 r- cc LO
c 1 1 KO CD i— 1 1 1 1
to i i O f— O 1 l 1 1 CM
c i i • • 1 1 1 1 •
<T3 o o o lO
CD
tO
r~» .— 00
CD CD | toO O i o
• IGO O
C CM CO
I O CM I o
I r— O I i—
I . • I •
o o o 1^-
CM
CO
CO
(C
<:
a.
o
a.
o
s-
3
UJ
o
-_
a;
«T3
-C i.
4->
C 1-
<C HI (H L
Q.U3 -C <>0
id o: +J ooOD.CDliJUJO<0 I— -—
to
4J --~
o a;
CL C
x c
Uj o
4->
+•> oO f—
ai
o -—
•r- <u
- c
CL. C
o
»->
-M
S- \
o **»
Q.OO
x rzi
UJ -—
-29-
c
+-> a> e
s_ a o
o •<- +->
E Q- *^
•—
< 00
r- i- r- O CO Cl CO r- p-
>-
<
CO
<D
CO c
r- -M c
<o s_ o
4-> O +->
i-i o
LT) ^- r— CO r— lOr- Lf> Lf> to
IT)
o_
o
<
UJ>.
<->
_J
^°
oo S
UJ =5
UJ =
"S CT>
c2
CL)O
s-
z:
O
c/>
on
co
UJ
o
UJ
<J) Lf)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 *fr CO
1 I 1 1 1 I 1 o o r^
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • •
o o «* oo
C
•r—
-r->
C
ai
en
s_
<c
Lf)
I I CO
l I o o
CM en
en
fj
+J
cocco
LO «T CO IO O O I
o o o
I I I I
CM
CC o
o
fO
c
ra
o
OO
ID
in
aj
a
p— uoOi— encooor- co
r— r— P^-OOCOOCMi—OOOr— ooooo
ooooooooo
VO^r-CMOC^CMOCM
r-CMcri^CMr^CMOOCMOOOr— ooooo
CO CO
CT>
CO
o o o O O o o o o LC ^_
CM en
<TJ
at O
Q. •^ 4->
o s_ CO i-
L. ai +-> •— o3 E t- CO a. -^*»
<o UJ < o a; X aj
•r— a> CL £Z Ul c
CO Q. • • x c C
< O 3 00 Ul o aj o
L. ra +J en -t->
c s- =3 s_ o s- r— fO <u ^•s^
03 <U CH Ul a> CVI rrjl© s- CJ V»Q-O J= 00 o J= s~ .JZ -t-^ o a> •1
—
oo
ro CC +-> 00 . UJ -t-> it- •*-> O r— > c rD
-0 Q- O 13 Ul u. O 's: o 1— -— <: CL.
-30-
TABLE IV: COMPARISON OF TRADE MATRICES FOR SIMULATED
MARKET CONDUCT WITH ACTUAL TRADE
Market Conduct
Free
Trade Duopoly Triopoly Duopsony
0.485 0.265 0.275 0.433
0.065 0.00002 0.017 0.047
-0.262 -0.242 -0.292 -0.407
Theil Inequality
Coefficient3
Variance Proportion3
Spearman Rank
Correlation Coefficient^
The closer to zero, the better.
Reject at 90% (95%) level the null hypothesis that the model
predicts trade if the absolute value of the coefficient exceeds 0.248
(0.295).
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